How Unions Affect Shareholder Wealth In Firms Announcing  Layoffs by NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University & Pouder, Richard W.
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
How Unions Affect Shareholder Wealth In Firms 
Announcing  Layoffs
By: Richard W. Pouder, Hugh D. Hindman, and R. Stephen Cantrell
Abstract
We investigate whether investor anticipation of future performance differs between union and nonunion firms 
following corporate layoff announcements. Using event­study methodology and multivariate regression analysis, 
we find that the stock market reaction to layoff announcements is negatively related to nonunion firms and 
positively related to union firms.
Pouder, R.W., Hindman, H.D. & Cantrell, R.S. J Labor Res (2004) 25: 495. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12122-004-1027-4. Publisher version of record available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s12122-004-1027-4
 
How Unions Affect Shareholder Wealth in 
Firms Announcing  Layoffs 
RICHARD W. POUDER and HUGH D. HINDMAN 
Appalachian  State  University, Boone, NC 28608 
R. STEPHEN CANTRELL 
Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634 
 
We investigate whether investor anticipation of future performance differs between 
union and nonunion firms following corporate layoff announcements. Using event- 
study methodolog y and multivariate reg ression analysis, we find that the stock mar- 
ket reaction to layoff announcements is negatively related to nonunion firms and 
positively related to union firms. 
 
I. Introduction 
Several recent studies in the strategic management literature have investigated the rela- 
tionship between layoff announcements and shareholder wealth and have shown that 
certain characteristics of the announced layoff act as signals which guide i nvestors' 
reactions to the announcement (Lee, 1997; Urse) and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995; Wor- rell 
et al., 1991). Another research stream in the industrial relations literature has inves- tigated 
the influence of union-related announcements on shareholder wealth, including strikes 
(Becker and Olson. 1989), u nion organizing (Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984), union 
decertification (Pearce et al., 1995), bargaining (Abowd, 1989), concession bar- gaining 
(Becker, 1987), and introduction of profit-sharing plans (Florkowski and Shas- tri, 1992). 
This research generally supports the idea that u nion-related  annou ncements affect 
shareholder wealth. 
Taken together, these two research streams suggest the possibility that investors' 
reactions to layoff announcements may be conditioned by the firm's union status. To 
date, no published study in either the strategic management literature or industrial rela- 
tions literature has examined this topic. This study determines whether investors' reac- 
tions to layoff announcements differ between union and nonunion firms. We conduct 
our investigation using event-study methodology and multivariate analysis in a sample 
of union and nonunion firms making layoff announcements over the period 1989-1996. 
 
II. Background 
Layoff Announcements and Shareholder Wealth. Over the past two decades, nearly all 
Fortune 1000 firms have had at least one permanent layoff of employees. The growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of layoffs in U.S. corporations during this time has sparked much research on how lay- 
offs affect shareholder wealth. Worrell et al. (1991) used an event-study methodology to 
show an overall significant, negative investor reaction to layoff announcements. Similar 
reactions have been observed in Canadian (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995) and 
Japanese corporations (Lee, 1997), suggesting that a layoff announcement often confirms 
or signals to investors a firm's financial problems  (Worrell et al.,  1991). 
Although layoff announcements decrease shareholder wealth in the aggregate, 
investors' reactions will likely vary according to information they seek and obtain on 
characteristics of both the announcement and the firm. For example, investors tend to 
react more negatively to layoffs at firms with poor financial performance prior to the 
announcement (Urse! and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995; Worrell et al., 1991). Furthermore, 
proactive  layoff  announcements  -those citing  attempts  to improve  firm  efficiency 
or profitability -have a smaller negative impact on shareholder wealth than reactive 
layoff announcements -those citing declining demand or financial distress as moti- 
vating the layoff (Lee, 1997; Worrell et al., 1991). Research has also shown a nega- 
tive relationship between shareholder wealth and  the percentage  of  workers  that  a firm 
intends to lay off (Lee, 1997; Worrell et al., 1991). In addition, investors react more 
negatively when a firm makes a single layoff announcement than when it makes multiple 
announcements  (Lee,  1997). 
Unions and Shareholder Wealth. Unions, on behalf of their members, are viewed 
as competing with shareholders for corporate wealth. As a rule, the greater the level 
of unionization, the lower the profitability of the firm as measured by returns to share- 
holders (Becker and Olson, 1989; Hirsch, 1991). So shareholders may perceive that their 
interests would be better served in nonunion, or less unionized, firms. 
It is not simply a matter of labor costs, however. Certainly unions elevate the costs 
of wages and benefits, but offsetting productivity gains, where they are achieved, may 
neutralize the impact on labor costs (Belman, 1992). Still, the perception that unions 
elevate labor costs continues to be a powerful impetus for management opposition to 
unionization (Rose and Chaison, 1996). Unions may not extract monopoly profits, that 
is, claim larger shares in highly concentrated industries. Instead, unions compete for 
expenditures in discretionary areas such as research and development (Hirsch and Con- 
nolly, 1987) and capital investment (Voos and Mishel,  1986). What  is seen as good 
for the union and its members is generally viewed as detracting from  shareholder wealth. 
Shareholders do not need to rely exclusively on management to secure their inter- 
ests vis-a-vis unions. Shareholders can also condition their investment decisions on 
various union activities and events. The event-methodology studies cited previously 
indicate that investors react negatively to union gains. They react negatively to union 
organizing efforts, and even more so when those organizing efforts are successful 
(Ruback and Zimmerman, 1984), but they react positively when unions are decertified 
(Pearce et al., 1995). They react negatively to strikes, depending on their duration and 
intensity (Becker and Olson, 1986), and negatively to union wage gains (Abowd, 1989), 
  
 
 
but positively to concessionary agreements (Becker, 1987) and to the introduction of 
profit-sharing plans (Florkowski and Shastri, 1992). 
Unions, Layoffs, and Shareholder Wealth. If investors generally react negatively 
to layoff announcements, should they be expected to react any differently when those 
announcements are issued by more heavily unionized firms? In either case, the layoff 
announcement sends negative signals. If investors interpret the announcement as con- 
veying information about the firm only, we should expect the null hypothesis -that 
there are no significant differences in shareholder wealth between union and nonunion 
firms. If,alternatively, investors interpret layoff announcements in union firms to imply 
a weakening of the union's position, their negative stock-market reaction may be tem- 
pered somewhat by this more favorable information, so the stock market reaction might 
be less negative or even positive in union firms. Or there might simply be less share- 
holder reaction to announcements in union firms. Either way, the alternative hypoth- 
esis suggests a less unfavorable or favorable shareholder reaction to layoffs in more 
unionized firms. 
 
III. Methods and Data 
Event Study. Following the event-study methodology presented in detail in Brown 
and Warner (1985), we estimate a market model for each firm and then derive esti- 
mates of abnormal returns in union and nonunion firms. Assuming an announcement 
date of t = 0, we estimate market model parameters for each firm over a one-year (240- 
trading-day) period from day t = -331 to day t = -91. We then calculate abnormal 
returns as deviations from returns expected if there were no announcement, as esti- 
mated by the market model. Abnormal returns for each firm are standardized by their 
standard deviations to derive standardized abnormal returns and summed for all firms 
to compute a measure of the cumulative abnormal returns over the number of days com- 
prising the event window. Daily stock return data come from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) equally weighted market index for announcements for firms 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ. 
Sample Construction. We obtained our sample by searching the Wall Street Index 
for layoff announcements over the years 1989-1996. Our sample is limited to firms 
in the manufacturing and transportation/utility industries because firms in these indus- 
tries have a higher proportion of union membership than firms in other industries. We 
included only permanent layoff announcements because an insignificant number of the 
announcements involved temporary layoffs. Including only permanent layoff announce- 
ments in the sample is not problematic, since previous research has shown that tem- 
porary layoffs have significantly less imp.act on investors' anticipation of the future 
financial performance of the firm (Lee, 1997; Worrell et al., 1991). We deleted announce- 
ments if a merger or acquisition, stock split, change in dividend policy, or top man- 
agement change was reported for the firm during the three days before and the one 
day following the layoff announcement. As McWilliams and Siegel (1997, p. 634) 
report, eliminating the effect of contaminating events such as these "is perhaps the most 
 
 
 
 
critical assumption of the [event-study] methodology." Using these sampling criteria, 
our initial sample consisted of 233 unique announcements for 132 firms. 
A weakness in our data set is that only seven of the 121 announcements for union 
firms conveyed information that clearly indicated whether union workers would be 
affected by the layoff. This pattern is consistent with the fact that layoff announce- 
ments rarely convey information on occupational characteristics or labor-management 
disputes (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995). Although industry analysts and, hence, 
their investor clients are likely to know the union status of workers targeted for lay- 
offs, our analysis is limited solely to union status at the level of firms rather than indi- 
vidual employees. For a firm's union status, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
publication, Companies (National ) With Unions (as o/ 913196). This source, which con- 
sists of companies having collective bargaining agreements that cover 1,000 or more 
workers, provided information on the number of workers affected, as well as the effec- 
tive and expiration dates of collective bargaining agreements. For the 1989-1996 study 
period we found that 24.4 percent of the transportation, communications, and public 
utility firms and 22.9 percent of the manufacturing firms were unionized. 
Regression Analysis. We estimated a multivariate regression to test the joint influ- 
ence of characteristics of the layoff announcement on shareholder wealth. The cross- 
sectional variation in cumulative abnormal returns is regressed on union status and 
other previously discussed announcement characteristics. As a measure of union sta- 
tus, we calculated the proportion of union workers in a firm for each announcement 
as a measure of un ion status. For a firm's pre-announcement performance, we used 
data obtained in the Compustat Data Tapes to compute the percentage change in indus- 
try-adjusted profit margin for the two years prior to the announcement year. To account 
for investors' assessment of layoff announcements as reactive or proactive, we read 
and coded each announcement (0 = reactive layoff; 1 = proactive layoff). We also 
included the percentage of the firm's work force targeted in the layoff. While some 
announcements provided a percentage, others gave only a total number. To calculate 
a percentage, we divided number of layoffs by total employment as reported in the pre- 
vious quarter in the Compustat Data Tapes. In addition, we accounted for possible 
differences in the information conveyed in single versus multiple announcements made 
by the same firm. We searched the Wall Street Journal Index for a three-year period 
prior to the current announcement to find multiple layoff announcements (coded as 0 
= single announcement; 1 = multiple announcements). Finally, we included total firm 
employment to control for size effects, since larger firms tend to lay off greater pro- 
portions of union workers than their smaller counterparts (Groothuis, 1994). 
 
IV. Research Findings 
We found no statistically significant differences between mean abnormal returns for 
firms in each industry category and therefore report findings for combined industries. 
Table 1 presents the cumulative abnormal returns and Z-statistics over an event win- 
dow that includes the announcement date, the day preceding the announcement date, 
  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and (Z-Statistics ) 
for Days -I to 1 
 
All Firms 
(N==233) 
Union Firms 
(N=l 21) 
Nonunion Firms 
(N=l l 2) 
 
  
-0.0045 
(-1.37) 
0.0014 
(0.76) 
-0.0109** 
(-2.77) 
 
 
Note: • (**,***) indicate significance at the . JO (.01, .001) level, two- 
tailed test. 
 
 
 
and the day following the announcement date. This three-day event window is fre- 
quently used in event studies and assumes that the effects of events are quickly incor- 
porated into firms' stock prices in efficient capital markets (McWilliams and Siegel, 
1997). For all firms in the sample, there is a negative market reaction to layoff 
announcements. Although not statistically significant, the overall negative reaction con- 
curs with previous research findings. Table 1 also shows a negative and statistically 
significant cumulative return for nonunion firms and a positive, though not significant, 
cumulative return for union firms. Thus, the union status of a firm might help investors 
interpret the impact of a layoff on firm value. Moreover, we found a statistically sig- 
nificant difference between mean cumulative abnormal returns in union and nonunion 
firms (t ==  1.98; p < .05). 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis that tests how union status 
and other layoff characteristics jointly influence cumulative abnormal returns over 
the same three-day window used in the univariate test. The results of this more robust 
test of union status show that the coefficient on the percentage of union workers is pos- 
itive and significant, thus supporting the inferences from the univariate test. The results 
are also consistent with previous studies. In support of findings by Lee ( 1997), we show 
that proactive announcements are a significant positive predictor of abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, a firm's recent financial performance provides an important signal to 
investors about future prospects (Ursel and Armstrong-Stassen, 1995; Worrell et al., 
1991), as evidenced in the positive and significant coefficient on pre-announcement 
earnings. 
 
V. Conclusion 
On the surface, a firm's union status matters in how the stock market reacts to layoff 
announcements, and the presence of a union reverses the expected negative reaction. 
But what explains these positive (or at least nonnegative) returns to layoff announce- 
ments in more unionized firms? To the extent that union members were more likely 
to be laid off, our findings are generally consistent with previous research that union- 
  
 
 
Table 2 
Results  of Regression Analysis 
(standard errors in parentheses, N = 200) 
 
. ·· ----· --- 
Intercept 
--·· ·- - 
-0.014 
  (0.01 2) 
Percentage Unionized  0.014** 
(0.007) 
Percentage Layoff  -0.001 
  (0.001) 
Firm Size•  0.001 
  (0.001) 
Reason for  Layoff  0.008** 
(0.004) 
Prior Layoff  --0.001 
  (0.004) 
Profit Marginb  0.001 ** 
  (0.000) 
F-statistic 
R2 (%) 
 3.03*** 
8.6 
Notes: *(**,***) indicate significance at the . I 0 (.05, .0 I ) level using 
two-tailed test. 'Natural log of variable. bRatio of income before 
extraordinary items to total sales. 
 
 
 
related events that signal a weakening of the position of the union produce positive 
investor reactions. Unfortunately, our inability to determine the union status of laid- 
off workers is a major limitation. Future research that can more accurately ascertain 
the union status of workers affected by layoffs should address this gap. Until then, there 
is no reason to assume, ceteris paribus, that layoffs disproportionately affect a firm's 
union members, however much unionized the firm. Whether union members were more 
likely to be laid off because they were more expensive to keep or whether union mem- 
bers were less likely to be laid off because they were more expensive to let go is a 
key empirical question that we did not address. 
If layoff announcements in unionized firms do not signal the layoff of union mem- 
bers, it is less clear how the absence of a negative stock market reaction should be 
explained. It appears that investors treat these layoff announcements much like they 
treat proactive layoff announcements. One explanation that is consistent with our find- 
ings, yet seems improbable, is that investors recognize the recuperative value of unions 
to firms in trouble. That is, a firm facing layoffs may be a firm in trouble, but one 
  
 
 
with a union  may be seen as having an ally with clear interests in assuring the long- 
run viability of the firm in order to protect the remaining jobs. 
In sum, further research is needed in order to fully explain our findings. Perhaps 
event methodologies could be coupled with interview or survey research that more 
directly taps the perceptions of investors and senior executives. Another intriguing 
research question is how the stock market would react to announcements of hiring 
union versus nonunion workers. Hiring announcements would generally send strong 
positive signals to the market. In line with our findings, however, would the hiring of 
union workers be associated with a negative market reaction? 
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